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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, CASTE,. AND
CULTURAL COMPARISONS
Cass R. Sunstein*
What is permitted, and what is prohibited, by the equality prin
ciple of a liberal democracy? Does affirmative action run afoul of
that principle?

And where should we look to answer these

questions?
Many critics of affirmative action take it as axiomatic that af
firmative action violates the equality principle. But this is far from
clear. Every law classifies. The current law of equality itself classi
fies by, for example, treating discrimination on the basis of race dif
ferently from discrimination on the basis of age. No one thinks that
the law of equality is, for this reason, inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause. No one thinks that constitutional doctrine gives
a "special preference" to race discrimination. Whether affirmative
action violates the equality principle depends on the content of that
principle.
There is good reason to think that the best understanding of the
equality principle of the United States Constitution has a great deal
to do with a prohibition on second-class citizenship, or "caste."1
An anticaste principle can claim considerable support from the the
ory and the practice of those who defend the Fourteenth Amend
ment. Such a principle also fits well - far from perfectly, but well
- with the general fabric and thrust of constitutional doctrine. As
a matter of political theory, the anticaste principle also has consid
erable appeal, connected as it is with some of the defining ideals of
liberal democracy, which is designed to ensure that morally irrele
vant characteristics are not turned into a systematic basis for social
disadvantage.2 The anticaste principle seems to serve as a promis
ing basis for both organizing and reformulating many aspects of the
law of equal protection.
Of course the implications of the anticaste principle must be
specified, and here reasonable people can differ. I have urged, for
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example, that the principle forbids government from turning mor
ally irrelevant and highly visible characteristics into a basis for sys
temic

social

disadvantage.

Whether

or

not

that

particular

specification is valid, and whether or not it counts as a sufficient
specification, it seems clear that the anticaste principle would raise
no serious questions about affirmative action policies. The basic
reason is that it is implausible to say that such policies entrench
second-class citizenship. No one urges, or could urge, that such pol
icies would make whites, or for that matter African Americans, into
second-class citizens. This is not to say that affirmative action poli
cies are a good idea. To be sure, they may have stigmatizing effects
on their intended beneficiaries, and they may also increase rather
than decrease racial antagonism. But these are essentially political
complaints, not constitutional ones. Some people, for example, ob
ject that affirmative action programs reflect pity and condescension
toward African Americans3 - an interesting objection to the
meaning and consequences of such programs, not entirely discon
nected from the problem of second-class citizenship. But this ob
jection, partly empirical in nature, is best heard in legislatures
rather than courtrooms.
Clark Cunningham and N.R. Madhava Menon have contributed
a great deal to the debate over racial equality through their intrigu
ing discussion of caste, and anticaste, in India. American legal de
bates are often remarkably parochial, and the American debate
over the anticaste principle has given strikingly little attention to
comparative questions. This is an especially serious omission in
light of the fact that the caste system in India seems to be a primary
inspiration for those complaining about caste-like features of
American life. Let me emphasize a few of the valuable points that
Cunningham and Menon offer. First, they suggest that the Indian
caste system operates without

"highly visible" characteristics.

High-caste Indians might look much like low-caste Indians. Sec
ond, they suggest that in India, systemic social disadvantages began
first, and only later created stigmatic differences to "mark the dis
advantage." In America, the sequence was, or seems to have been,
just the opposite. Thus, in India caste is "clearly a social construc
tion," unlike in the United States, where it is believed that "race" is
an immutable and obvious physical condition.
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, India has gone down the
route not traveled by the United States, which has adhered to the
3. See SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED (1998).
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view that past discrimination is sufficient justification for affir
mative action. India has tackled with some sophistication the issue
whether different, particular groups have different needs for affirm
ative action. For example, the Indian government looks to various
factors indicating group status, placing importance on whether the
relevant unit "practices extensive endogamy, restricting marriage to
other group members." In India, social and economic factors help
undergird the judgment about the kind of compensatory measure to
which members of the relevant group are entitled.
Several features of this discussion are particularly striking. Per
haps the most striking is the very different nature of Indian debates
over affirmative action. While India has not avoided the high level
of contentiousness that has characterized American debates, it has
self-consciously gone in the direction of a highly programmatic
method for redressing past social discrimination - an experiment
in social engineering far beyond anything in American law. From
the authors' description, moreover, it is unclear to what extent
there is a widespread perception of a pervasive conflict between
merit and affirmative action, or between liberty and equality, or of
affirmative action as an insidious way of providing protection to a
"special interest."
Cunningham and Menon deserve a great deal of credit for the
simple feat of bringing new information to bear on the debate over
affirmative action. Too often the American debate has operated in
a factual vacuum - a vacuum about both international and domes
tic experience. Their new facts should spark fresh discussion. I
would like to begin that discussion by offering three comments.
The first involves the critical role of facts in constitutional law; the
second involves the potential virtues of rule-free constitutional law;
the third involves the uses and limits of comparative constitutional
ism. The first two are inspired by what Cunningham and Menon
have to say, but I do not directly engage their argument; in the third
comment, I attempt to do this.
I.

FACTS RATHER THAN CONCEPTS

Constitutional and political debates about equality and liberty
often operate at a high level of abstraction. They raise questions,
for example, about whether we are committed to equality of oppor
tunity or instead equality of result, to individual rights or group
rights, or to equality over liberty or vice-versa. Often the argu
ments work by choosing one concept over another, by assembling
some particular practice that is said to tell, decisively, against a cer-
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tain claim or alleged principle (for example, the generally accepted
preferential treatment given to children of alumni), by suggesting
that a certain concept necessarily means a certain thing (as in the
view that equality necessarily forbids, or requires, affirmative ac
tion), or by specifying a concept with the suggestion that this, rather
than that, is the best specification (perhaps because it fits better
with the rest of what we believe).
These debates, though common and frequently illuminating,
often seem hopelessly conceptual and interminable, stylized, a form
of Kabuki theater; often no one is convinced at all, and, even worse,
often no one learns anything. I think that a great deal of further
progress might be made by learning more about the facts. It is very
hard to know where to stand on affirmative action programs with
out investigating some empirical questions. What do such programs
look like? How do they differ? The term "affirmative action" is
extremely broad, and it covers a wide range of activities in the pri
vate and public sectors and at the national, state, and local levels.
Do such programs actually stigmatize people, and if so in what
sense? These are empirical questions, not (only) conceptual ones.
And what are the actual differences in qualification between the
programs' beneficiaries and their victims, and how much difference
do these differences make? What would happen

if affirmative ac
if some alter

tion programs were abolished? What would happen

native short of affirmative action were adopted, such as wealth
based admissions judgments? What are the effects of affirmative
action programs for their intended beneficiaries in, for example,
college, medical school, and law school? Do such programs make
people better off, and

if so

in what sense?4

These questions are important because when progress cannot be
made on conceptual matters or on issues in high-level theory, it
might instead be made by investigating facts. This is the great
promise of empirical work: to enable progress and even closure
when conceptual debates produce uncertainty, holy wars, or blank
stares. I hypothesize, for example, that many people would be
skeptical of affirmative action programs to the extent that the rec
ord shows that they involve hiring people whose qualifications are
not marginally lower, but actually much lower than those of their
(majority group) competitors. It also seems likely that many critics
of affirmative action would be less critical

if

it appeared that the

4. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BoK, THE SHAPE OF TIIB RIVER (1998), for what
seems to me to be the most valuable contribution to the affirmative action debate in the last
decade.
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abolition of affirmative action would mean that only a handful of
African Americans would be able to attend the major law schools.
When people disagree on high principle, they can often be
brought into agreement, or at least make progress,

if they

investi

gate the facts.5 In the context of affirmative action we need much
more in the way of facts. A Supreme Court brief dealing with the
consequences of a principle of colorblindness would be far more
helpful than a brief quoting from past cases and pushing conceptual
arguments one way rather than another.

The discussion by

Cunningham and Menon is very much in this spirit insofar as com
parative work brings actual experience to bear on equality claims.
II.

AGAINS T RuLES, AGAINST JumcIAL REsoLUTIONs6

It is tempting to think that the Supreme Court has erred in
maintaining its casuistical, rule-free, fact-specific course in the con
text of affirmative action. This course might well seem to represent
a failure of the rule of law. But there are good reasons for the
Court to have followed this path. No clear constitutional commit
ment forbids affirmative action programs; as a matter of text and
history, the attack on such programs is remarkably weak.7 It is im
perative that constitutional law not be used to strike down political
judgments about which reasonable people differ and to which the
Constitution does not clearly speak - especially in light of the ab
sence of much factual knowledge by the judiciary of domestic or
international experiences with affirmative action. My emphasis on
the centrality of facts to the legal question is thus a reason for cau
tion from the judiciary, which ought not to invoke a controversial
reading of the Constitution when it is at least possible that a good
understanding of the facts would lead in another direction.
At the same time, it would be wrong to celebrate the democratic
character of the institutions that have adopted affirmative action
programs. On the contrary, the nation has not, until recently, had
much of a debate about affirmative action, and some of the relevant
programs have been adopted with far too little deliberation and far
too little democracy.

In these circumstances, the Court has

adopted, perhaps by inadvertence, an intriguing alternative to the
three conventional options of validation, invalidation, and denial of
certiorari. That alternative consists of rulings that draw sharp at5. Thus facts are a great ally, and a potential part, of incompletely specified agreements.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
6. I borrow here from CAss R. SUNSTEIN,
7.

See id. at 125-29.

ONE

CASE

AT A TIME 117-36

(1999).
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tention to underlying questions of policy and principle - which ac
tivates political debate - but that do not displace public discussion
and that leave a great deal undecided. This may well be taken as a
democratic approach to judicial review, one that falls in the basic
category of representation-reinforcement.
I think that Cunningham and Menon fortify this basic point.
They show that any simple solution to the problem may overlook
the wide range of possible approaches, and their investigation of
India reveals that a nation in some ways like our own has ap
proached the issue quite differently. We need much more work of
this kind in constitutional law. A judicial foreclosure of experimen
tation informed by international experience may well be hopelessly
parochial. The point applies not only to the law of equality, but
also to other areas of constitutional law; the approach to libel law,
for example, may well be improved by seeing how other nations do
things.
ill.

Noms ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of

the

discussion by

Cunningham and Menon involves its depiction of a path not taken
by the United States. Recall that India maintains a list of 3,500
"backward classes" and that empirical factors, including social dis
crimination, educational deprivation, and economic status, are used
to determine group status. Some groups - the most disadvantaged
- have their own independent quotas, generally proportional to
population. Other groups also receive a reserve, but one smaller
than their population share. Individual entitlements may depend
on whether the relevant individuals have been raised in privileged
circumstances. Thus there is a careful, elaborate, and quite refined
method for determining how government policies will counteract or
even dismantle the system of caste. India appears, in short, to be
engaged in a process of social engineering that goes well beyond
anything in American practice.
A full assessment of India's program would require answers to
two questions: (1) Does the Indian approach make sense for India?
(2) Would that approach, or some variation on that approach, make

sense for the United States? I cannot attempt a full assessment

here, but let me venture a few puzzles and thoughts. The first ques
tion itself raises several questions.
Does this kind of close attention to caste background increase
or decrease social antagonism? Trmur Kuran has written of the
dangers of "ethnification," in which small shocks to a system can

March
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create widespread consciousness of ascriptive (or other) differ
ences, in a way that eventually causes segregation, resentment, ha
tred, and even violence.8 Is there any similar problem in India?
Cunningham and Menon suggest the possibility of an affirmative
answer. A great risk of race-conscious or ethnicity-conscious poli
cies is that they can heighten attention to questions of race and
ethnicity in a way that compromises social cohesion. (Of course
social cohesion is not the only social goal, and may not be in good
shape in the first instance.)
Does the system create, or is it perceived to create, a kind of
caste spoils system? Judgments about the degree of disadvantage
are hardly a purely scientific enterprise, and controversial judg
ments are likely to enter into any decision about who counts as suf
ficiently disadvantaged. There is also a natural risk here of strategic
and self-interested behavior, in which groups jockey with one an
other for position as "most disadvantaged," with harmful conse
quences for society as a whole. Nor is it an unambiguous good if
members of one or another group play the game of "more victim
ized than thou." Does this happen in India?
Does this system significantly weaken the Indian economy?
Does it compromise performance-related goals, and

if

so to what

extent? It is surely imaginable that such a system might compro
mise merit, rightly conceived (though of course this is a contestable
ideal). From what Cunningham and Menon have said, however,
there is no clear answer to this question.
The fact that India seems to have arrived at its approach
through something close to agreement (if that is a fact) is extremely
illuminating, but it is not by itself a sufficient reason to think that
the approach is justified. It would be helpful

if

Cunningham and

Menon would, in the future, say a bit more about the above ques
tions. Their current discussion focuses more on describing the In
dian practice than on demonstrating its success, or even on
identifying the criteria by which success or failure might be
measured.
What about America? Cunningham and Menon appear to be
lieve that America should have taken the road suggested by some
Justices in Bakke: that is, the Court should have allowed the polit
ical branches to conclude that past social discrimination is sufficient

8. See Tllllur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cas
cades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998).
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to justify affirmative action programs.9 I very much agree with this
judgment:

if the nation, or a state, would like to compensate for the

continuing effects of past discrimination, there should be no consti
tutional problem so long as the program is reasonably well-tailored.
The Court should have allowed the government room to maneuver
in this way, and future courts should allow the democratic process

to handle this sharply contested issue in any reasonable manner. 10
But the further question remains: Should the political process in
America attempt to do something like what India has done?

The most obvious response is that this is a genuinely academic
question. There is no possibility that the United States would at
tempt to identify the fifty groups, let alone the 3,500 groups, which
ought to qualify as backward classes. But as in India, the existence
of a political consensus or obstacle cannot be decisive; perhaps the
consensus or obstacle is wrong. Our own anticaste principle, re
flected in our history and our practices, seems to emphasize highly
visible identifying characteristics (most notably race and gender),
on the theory that such characteristics present the greatest opportu
nities for unjustified and pervasive subordination. The anticaste
idea builds narrowly from the cases of African Americans to pick
up women and the handicapped (with a partial, limited inclusion of
homosexuals). This limitation is not entirely without appeal. A de
cent society does not humiliate its members,11 and humiliation is
especially likely when the government discriminates against people
whose characteristics are highly visible. (Of course it is not limited
to those cases.)
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, it is easiest to main
tain a caste society, even when market forces are quite vigorous,
when the characteristics that lead to lower-caste status are highly
visible. It is in such circumstances that customers and coworkers

can most easily entrench existing inequality.12 It is in such circum

stances that rational discrimination may result in the use of sex and
race as proxies. And it is in such circumstances that screening strat9. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 344 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
10. It follows that the decision of the court of appeals in Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), was a mistake, indeed a form of hubris; a lower court should not
forbid educational institutions from proceeding in this way without a much clearer signal
from the Supreme Court.
11. See the excellent discussion in AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomi
Goldblum trans., 1996).
12. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BooK OF TALES 23·44 (1984);
Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and Employment Outcomes
for Minority Workers, 113 QJ. EcoN. 835 (1998).
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egies may perpetuate social subordination.13 Market forces are es
pecially unpromising correctives to caste-like aspects of society
when a highly visible characteristic is at work in the context of sys
temic social disadvantages.
None of these points suggests that this limited anticaste princi
ple, understood by reference to American understandings and ex
periences, is ideal, even for America. Surely the anticaste principle
does not exhaust the content of the notion of equality. At a mini
mum, there is also a place for an antidiscrimination principle, for
fair equality of opportunity (an idea that cuts very broadly), and for
programs of redistribution designed to ensure that everyone lives in
minimally decent conditions. These ideas overlap with the anticaste
principle but are independent of it. It is even possible to think that
the three ideas would do most of the good work done by the anti
caste efforts in India, perhaps more successfully. Thus, for example,
I might speculate that an effort to ensure fair equality of opportu
nity, and minimally decent conditions for all, bears something of the
same relation to the Indian experience as a negative income tax
bears to minimum wage legislation. A negative income tax is a far
more effective and direct way of assisting the poor than a minimum
wage increase.14 So too, an insistence on fair equality of opportu
nity and minimally decent conditions might well be a far more ef
fective and direct way of dealing with systemic disadvantages than
India's extremely complex affirmative action program.
For America, with its very different history, a large question is
whether a limited anticaste principle, suitably supplemented with
these other ideals, is not a better approach to the problem of in
equality than an approach that would attempt compensatory mea
sures for a wide range of socially disadvantaged groups. It is even
possible to wonder whether India might not have done better to
adopt a narrower anticaste principle for the most disadvantaged
groups, and to attempt to promote other equality goals with other
policies, including better education and job training, and minimal
economic and social guarantees for all, ensuring against desperate
conditions.15 But it is very hard to disentangle this normative judg
ment from an awareness of political and cultural understandings,
which obviously diverge between India and America, perhaps espe13. See Bradford Cornell & lvo Welch, Customs, Information, and Screening Discrimina
tion, 104 J. PoL. EcoN. 542 (1996).
14. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal
Subsidy Policy, 64 U. Cm. L. REv. 405 (1997).
15.

Cf. INDIAN DEVELOPMENT (Jean Dreze & Amartya Sen eds., 1997).
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cially so in their different conceptions of what it means to undo a
system of caste.
CONCLUSION
For constitutional purposes, the American equality principle has
been an anticaste principle - one that forbids government from
turning a morally irrelevant and highly visible characteristic into a
systemic basis for second-class citizenship. This principle ought not
to be taken to authorize federal judges to invalidate reasonable af
firmative action programs. The appropriate content of such pro
grams should be a democratic rather than a judicial responsibility;
the most extreme judicial attacks on affirmative action programs
are a form of hubris.
On the other hand, we know far too little to declare that our
current programs are working well. There are two promising paths
for the future, both of them involving facts. The first is to learn a
great deal more about the operations, achievements, and failures of
multiple approaches, race-conscious and otherwise, and to see
which of them provides a good model for the future.16 The second
is to see what might be learned from the experience of other na
tions. The analysis provided by Cunningham and Menon offers no
unambiguous lessons for the United States, but it offers a great deal
of illumination about our possibilities and prospects.

16. For an excellent model in this regard, see

BoWEN

&

BoK, supra note

4.

